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Abstract
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Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4662
Infrastructure is the engine for economic growth. The 
international donor community has spent about 70–100 
billion U.S. dollars on infrastructure development 
in developing countries every year. However, it is 
arguable whether these financial resources are used 
efficiently, particularly whether the current infrastructure 
procurement prices are appropriate. Without doubt a 
key is competition to curb public procurement costs. 
This paper analyzes procurement data from multi 
and bilateral official development projects in three 
infrastructure sectors: roads, electricity, and water and 
sanitation. The findings show that the competition effect 
This paper—a product of the Economics Unit, Finance, Economics and Urban Development Department—is part 
of a larger effort in the department to understand and investigate efficiency and effectiveness in public infrastructure 
procurement. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may 
be contacted at aiimi@worldbank.org.  
is underutilized. To take full advantage of competition, 
at least seven bidders are needed in the road and water 
sectors, while three may be enough in the power sector. 
The paper also shows that not only competition, but 
also auction design, especially lot division, is crucial 
for reducing unit costs of infrastructure. Based on the 
estimated efficient unit costs, the annual financial needs 
are estimated at approximately 360 billion U.S. dollars. 
By promoting competition, the developing world might 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Infrastructure has been recognized as one of the most important engines for economic growth 
(e.g., World Bank, 1994). The developing world has received about 70–100 billion U.S. 
dollars of official development assistance (ODA) a year, of which roughly 12–14 percent has 
been spent on infrastructure development. Although private financing has been growing in 
several areas for recent years, the public resources continue to have an important role to play 
in stimulating and catalyzing infrastructure investment in developing countries.  
 
Public resources deployable for infrastructure are limited in particular in low-income 
countries. It is essential to ensure that a finite amount of resources should be used most 
effectively in connection with good governance. The best way to find fiscal space for public 
investment is to eliminate waste and improve technical efficiency in public expenditure 
(World Bank, 2005). Efficiency in public procurement has widely been called for more than 
two decades. However, it is still arguable how the public resources, including foreign aid, can 
be used more efficiently, particularly where the public procurement systems are fragile.  
 
The current paper, focusing on unit costs of infrastructure, examines to what extent 
procurement efficiency could be improved for large-scale infrastructure projects assisted by 
multi- and bi-lateral donors. Particular attention is paid to the effect of intensifying 
competition at the procurement auction level. In general, the cost of development projects is 
expected to be reduced, as auctions become more efficient. Our evidence will be supportive 
of this, but the degree of competition required varies across infrastructure sectors.  
 
Based on the estimated equilibrium bid function, the paper revisits the traditional question of 
financial needs for infrastructure development in developing countries. As per Fay and Yepes 
(2003), annual investment needs amount to 470 billion U.S. dollars or 5.5 percent of GDP in 
developing countries during 2000–10.
1 Unlike the existing literature, the paper will cast light 
                                                 
1 For the road, electricity, water supply and sanitation sectors, the requirement is estimated at 264 billion U.S. 
dollars per annum.    - 3 -
on the unit price of infrastructure, rather than quantity. Despite the causality issue, it is 
already agreeable that economic growth necessitates a certain amount of public infrastructure. 
But it is much less clear whether the current procurement prices of infrastructure are the 
lowest possible. If they are suboptimal, the total financial requirements could be lowered 
through improving public procurement efficiency.  
 
Official development assistance has continued to be sizable and has picked up in the last 
three years (e.g., OECD, 2007). In 2006 the international donor community—including not 
only OECD member countries but all donors—disbursed about 100 billion U.S. dollars, of 
which Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries contributed to roughly 95 
percent. Assistance efforts are increasingly concentrated on North Africa and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Figure 1). By sector, total official assistance from DAC member states for 
infrastructure development—defined as the energy, transport, communications, water supply 
and sanitation sectors in the current paper—amounted to 12 billion U.S. dollars, which is 
equal to 12 percent of total net ODA (Figure 2).
2 This represents about 0.1–0.2 percent of 
total GDP of developing countries. From the donor point of view, it is equivalent to 0.03–
0.04 percent of total GDP of OECD countries. However, this amount is far below the recent 
demand forecast, e.g., 470 billion U.S. dollars pointed out above.  
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Source: OECD.Stat Extracts.  
 
                                                 
2 The water supply and sanitation sector is usually classified under the “social infrastructure and services” 
category, instead of “economic infrastructure,” which includes energy, communications and transport.    - 4 -
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Source: OECD.Stat Extracts.  
 
Regardless of the continued importance of and donors’ recent efforts toward infrastructure 
assistance, the allocation to infrastructure, including water and sanitation, appears stagnant 
with a peak of the sectoral share in 1996 (Figure 3). The allocation to the social sector, such 
as health and education, continues much stable at about 15 percent. On the other hand, the 
infrastructure sector amounted to over 25 percent in the mid-1990s but dramatically declined 
to less than 15 percent by 2003. Energy and communications are two areas where official 
assistance faded out. Obviously, some of investments in these sectors—and transport to a 
lesser extent—were replaced with private financing.  
 





























































































































Source: OECD.Stat Extracts.  
 
Unfortunately, however, there are many pieces of anecdotal evidence indicating that these 
resources might be wasted through the public procurement systems. For instance, a series of   - 5 -
enterprise surveys reveal that informal payments are a common practice all over the world. In 
developing countries, firms are paying approximately as much as 1 percent of the contract 
amount to secure government purchases. In Sub-Saharan Africa, this reaches 3½ percent on 
average (Figure 4). Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda reports that the country is losing about 
1.5 percent of GDP a year due to corruption in public procurements (MS, 2005). Since the 
Uruguay Round conclusion in 1996, WTO has taken a lead to strengthen the Government 
Procurement Agreement (GPA), which requires member states to establish an open, 
transparent and nondiscriminatory procurement process for government procurements above 
the agreed thresholds. In 2007 the World Bank approved the Implementation Plan of 
Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) strategy, which aims to strengthen anticorruption 
processes at various levels.  
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Source: Enterprise Surveys.  
 
Then, a key policy question is how to improve efficiency in the public procurement systems. 
Unsurprisingly, competition for contracts is an essential factor, because governments do not 
know the underlying true project costs of private contractors. This is a fundamental 
asymmetric information problem that auctioneers must overcome when they aim to contract 
out a public service. The authorities may know their own costs, which are presumably too 
high compared with private costs. They may also be able to observe some pieces of “market-
based” engineering costs. But they never know the minimum possible project cost in the 
market. If they knew, they could negotiate and contract directly with the most efficient firm. 
Auction theory tells us that under standard circumstances intensifying competition at an   - 6 -
auction would induce bidding firms to reveal their true preferences—i.e., costs in our 
context—whence achieving efficient auction outcomes (e.g., Brannman, et al., 1987; Paarsch, 
1992).  
 
In large-scale infrastructure projects, an alleged concern is the limited competition among 
firms that repeatedly participate in the procurement process. Foster (2005) highlights this 
problem in the water-sector concession context, showing that at the most six firms have been 
applying for a series of auctions in Latin America. Whether or not to succeed in attracting a 
sufficient number of competitors is indeed a crucial determinant of efficiency in auction 
outcomes, as well demonstrated in the 3G mobile telecommunications experiences in Europe 
(e.g., Klemperer, 2002; van Damme, 2002; Seifert and Ehrhart, 2005).  
 
What are the benefits from intensified competition? First, it is expected to not only lead to 
economic efficiency but also prevent corruption and collusion. In theory, it becomes more 
difficult to agree on and sustain a collusive arrangement, as the number of potential players 
in a market increases. Particularly it is true when new entrants are involved. A nontrivial 
probability of not being awarded would significantly weaken bidders’ collusive incentive 
(e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991; Che and Kim, 2006). If competition makes collusion less 
likely to occur, the risk of corruption is also alleviated because corruption normally 
necessitates successful collusion among bidders.
3  
 
Notably, public procurements for infrastructure projects are normally sizable. The large 
contract amount will easily induce stakeholders involved—e.g., politicians, civil servants, 
contractors and even beneficiaries—to explicitly and implicitly collude with each other; the 
lure of enormous payoffs would be irresistible, regardless of a potential penalty if detected. If 
                                                 
3 Without binding collusive arrangement, corruption cannot be in effect for securing a target contract, because 
firms outside the collusive agreement may submit a better bid, breaking a prior agreement among collusive 
bidders. Hence, the incentive to engage in corrupt practices must be weakened under less collusive 
circumstances. However, if informal payment is so common and all bidders pay bribe to an auctioneer, auction 
theory may fail to expect the anticorruption effect from increased competition. This is because in a symmetric 
equilibrium, a shift of bidders’ underlying cost parameters caused by this bribe would just be added t oall 
bidders’ bids.    - 7 -
the above-mentioned enterprise survey result is directly applied to the recent aid figure, it 
means that 100–400 million U.S. dollars might be wasted for informal payments. 
Furthermore, when dead-weight losses are taken into account, the total economic cost may be 
1.2 to 2.9 times higher than the amount of bribes paid (Auriol, 2006).  
 
Second, strengthening competition in public procurement would be conducive to fostering 
good governance and market-oriented business environment in developing countries. Good 
governance is essential for economic growth, and many developing countries are wasting 
abundant resources for a variety of informal business practices, such as bribes and 
misappropriations.
4 Francisco and Pontara (2007), estimating the bribe propensity of firms in 
Mauritania, show that medium-sized enterprises remains relatively weak and thus tend to rely 
on bribery for expanding their business, which is in turn hindering the country’s private 
sector development. Olken (2005) shows that resource misuse reaches 20–30 percent of total 
(disbursed) costs in public road projects and that auditing by a central government agency 
has a positive impact on reducing such misuse.  
 
Auction-based procurement systems are inherently transparent, open, accountable, credible 
and nondiscriminatory, while mutual transactions involving a small number of players tend 
to be less transparent and more susceptible to collusion and corruption (Krishna, 2002; 
Boehm and Olaya, 2006). Transparent and efficient business practices in improved public 
procurement systems would have positive externalities on local private business behavior, 
raising competitiveness of the economy as a whole. Not surprisingly, there is a strong 
correlation between pervasive informal payment practices and side payments for public 
contracts, as shown in Figure 5. It depicts such a cross-country correlation from enterprise 




                                                 
4 There is a debate on whether good governance could contribute to economic growth at the aggregate level 
(Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Easterly, et al., 2004).    - 8 -
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Source: Enterprise Surveys.  
 
Finally, high efficiency caused by intense competition has positive impacts on recipient 
macroeconomies. It directly creates local business opportunities if local firms are involved in 
ODA projects. It also mitigates the Dutch disease syndrome associated with massive aid 
flows. If development projects are financed by official external borrowings, it is also 
conducive to alleviating national burdens of external debt repayments and servicing. From 
the aid donor point of view, high efficiency means that more development projects and 
programs could be supported by a fixed amount of aid money (Iimi, 2006).  
 
This paper empirically readdresses the question of whether the public infrastructure spending 
is efficient, focusing on the procurement unit costs. It will be estimated how many bidders 
are required for an auction to be competitive enough in each of the road, water and sanitation, 
and electricity sectors. Based on the estimated competition effect, the paper also calculates 
how much competition could contribute to improving efficiency in infrastructure 
procurements. The findings would demonstrate practical gains from strengthening public 
expenditure management and support the governance-growth linkage numerically.  
 
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section II reviews the existing literature on 
the competition effect in auctions. Section III describes our empirical model and data for 
estimating a conventional equilibrium bid function. Section IV summarizes the main 
estimation results. Section V discusses several policy implications. It attempts to refine the 
financial needs for infrastructure development based on our estimated efficient project prices.   - 9 -
The section also touches upon the importance of unobservable country-specific 
characteristics, such as a well-known unobserved “Africa-specific” fixed-effect.  
 
 
II. COMPETITION IN AUCTIONS: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The main objective of government purchase is to deliver the object or public services at the 
lowest costs with a reasonable level of quality. Auction theory suggests that the winning bid 
should tend to approach the lowest possible procurement price, as the number of participants 
in an auction increases. This proposition holds typically in the independent private value 
paradigm. Even in the common value paradigm, the positive competition effect may be 
expected to a certain extent (Paarsch, 1992). Of particular note, in the common value 
auctions the equilibrium bid may also increase with the number of bidders, because the risk 
of overestimating the true value of the object tends to increase as competition becomes more 
intense (e.g., Kagel and Levin, 1986).  
 
An important policy question is how many bidders are required for an auction to be 
competitive enough. It varies from sector to sector, depending on the nature of the objects to 
be sold (Table 1). In the infrastructure sector, the norm might be about eight firms.
5 The 
highway construction market (in Florida) becomes competitive with about six to eight 
bidders (Gupta, 2002). As per Iimi (2006), in ODA-related procurement auctions mainly for 
large social and infrastructure projects, the winning bid amount significantly decreases as the 
number of bidders rises to the level of about eight firms. In the U.S. offshore oil lease market, 
the similar level of bidder participation seems to be required (Brannman et al., 1987).  
 
In government procurement for forest-related services, a slightly smaller number of 
contenders—perhaps five—are needed for auction efficiency. Brannman et al. (1987) shows 
that 4–5 bidders are necessary for the timber seeding service contracts in the Pacific 
                                                 
5 It means that the marginal impact of one more bidder on the equilibrium bid is not statistically significant 
when the number of participants exceeds eight.   - 10 -
Northwest. In the case of plant seedling auctions, Paarsch (1992) indicates that although the 
timber seedling auctions are likely to be characterized as the common value paradigm, the 
expected winning bid would decline until the number of participants reaches roughly 5 to 10.  
 
By contrast, in the Internet-based auction, eBay, for a personal digital assistants device, the 
observed bid price tends to continue increasing with the number of bidders beyond the 
above-mentioned levels; the incremental effect would taper off only when more than 14 
bidders participate. Under the experimental setting, Kagel and Levin (1986) show that 
bidders tend to submit relatively aggressive bids in auctions with 6–7 participants, compared 
with the case with 3–4 bidders.  
 
Table 1. Competition Effects in Various Auctions  
Brannman et al. 
(1987)
U.S. municipal bond underwriters spreads 
in 1959-67.
5–8 9,420
U.S. offshore oil lease auctions from 1954 
to 1975.
7–9 2,211
U.S. National Forest Service timber 
auctions in 1977. 
4–5 639
Paarsch (1992) British Columbia's plant seedling contract 
auctions between 1985-88. 
About 5 144
Gupta (2002) Highway construction procurement auctions 
in Florida from 1981 to 1986.
6–8 1,937
Rezende (2005) Palm III personal digital assistants auctions 





Iimi (2006) Large-scale official development projects, 











Source: Author’s calculations from the original studies.  
 
As far as infrastructure projects are concerned, the observed level of competition is less than 
the general norm—e.g., eight. Iimi (2006) indicates that in Japan’s ODA procurement, the 
average number of bidders is about six. In the U.K. PFI projects, half of them attracted at 
most two or three bids prior to 2004 (NOA, 2007). In 2005-06, this share increased to as high 
as 80 percent; more than 30 percent of the PFI projects were competed for by only two 
bidders. Similarly, PPI database reveals that no more than five firms participate in bidding 
competition for PPP transactions in developing countries (Figure 6).  
   - 11 -
Even in the infrastructure sector, the number of firms who participate in each auction differs 
across sub-sectors. While the distributions of the number of bidders in road and 
telecommunications PPP contracts are not so concentrated, the energy sector has a more 
skewed distribution toward a left tail. In the water sector one can expect only one to three 
bidders in most cases.
6  
 











































































Source: Author’s calculation based on PPI database. 
 
The current paper pays particular attention to this difference across infrastructure sectors, 
which is ignored in the previous work (Iimi, 2006). An obvious disadvantage of focusing on 
a certain sub-sector is the small sample problem. This is related to a more fundamental 
empirical question that researchers must consider. One might think that all development 
                                                 
6 Recall that these PPP contracts are not only for infrastructure construction, on which our sample projects focus. 
Rather, they normally include operation and maintenance after construction and thus tend to require more 
managerial and operational expertise from contractors. Therefore, the observed degree of competition in PPP 
auctions may not be directly comparable with our results.    - 12 -
projects—particularly large-scale national projects—are different and unique. To 
compromise this problem, three main infrastructure sectors are selected in this paper: roads, 
electricity, and water and sanitation. Our sample data partly overlap with my previous work, 
which cover large ODA projects assisted by the Japanese Government. But the more detailed 
contract-specific information has been added. The current paper also uses a new dataset on 
broadly similar infrastructure projects financed by the World Bank.  
 
As expected, our sample reveals that the degree of procurement competition appears to differ 
among sectors (Figure 7). In road procurements, one can expect a number of competitors per 
auction—averaging 6.1 firms. The probability of attracting more than six firms to 
competitive bidding is considerable. By contrast, competition seems much limited in the 
other two sectors. It is consistent with the above PPP contract cases. In the water and sewage 
sector, the average number of bidders per auction is 6.2, but the distribution highly 
concentrates on  ; the median is 4. In the electricity sector, most auctions have attracted 
two or three firms. Formally, the extent to which competition takes effect is lowest in this 
area. The skewness is estimated at 2.02, which is higher than 0.63 in the water sector.  
3 = N
 
The above is naturally followed by the question of how many bidders are required to enhance 
auction efficiency in each of the infrastructure sectors. It seems that in electricity projects one 
cannot expect the same level of competition as road procurements. In addition, it is also 
debatable whether the current level of competition in the electricity sector is really sufficient 
to maximize the competition effect. If not, what can we do? The following sections address 
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Source: Author’s calculation based on JBIC and World Bank data.  
 
 
III. AN EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA  
 
Following the existing empirical auction literature (e.g., Porter and Zona, 1993; Gupta, 2002; 
Iimi, 2006), the following reduced-form equilibrium bid function is estimated:  
 
it t i t t t it N g Z X MONTH COST b ε δ γ β α α + + + + + = ) ; ( ' ' 2 1  
 
where bit is i’s bid amount at auction t. It is noteworthy that our dependent variable is the bid 
amount of all bidders, i.e., both winning and losing bidders. Note that in theory losing bids 
are as informative as winning bids to estimate the equilibrium bid function. The ODA-related 
procurement process normally uses a simple first-bid sealed-price auction format. Therefore,   - 14 -
all bidders equally have the incentive to submit their true equilibrium bid prices calculated 
based on their private information.  
 
N is the number of bidders who were prequalified (if applicable) and actually participated in 
the price competition. In our data, this variable is usually common knowledge prior to the 
bidding stage; in most cases, in practice, participants know how many rivals would submit 
bids, especially when the prequalification result is published.
7 The endogeneity of N is one of 
the important questions in the empirical auction literature (e.g., Li and Perrigne, 2003; 
Ohashi, 2008; Bajari., et al, forthcoming). With our data, a truncated negative binomial 
model has shown that almost none of the major contract attributes, such as estimated 
engineering costs, contract duration and technical evaluation practices, and potential ODA 
project backlogs, are significant in explaining the observed number of participants.
8 
Similarly, it has been found that the instrumental variable (IV) estimation with these 
variables as instruments would not significantly change the main results presented belo
possibly supporting the exogenous nature of our N def
w, 
inition.  
                                                
 
It is also noteworthy that our analytical framework is very static; N is irrelevant to how many 
firms constitute a bidding entity. Joint bidding practices are already given in our model. 
Potential bidders, who shown interest but did not participate in the process, are also ignored. 
But this setting is consistent with basic auction theory. Regarding the functional form for the 
competition effect, no presumption is imposed; we examine four specifications: linear, 
quadratic, log-linear and (partially) nonparametric.  
 
Two auction-specific variables are included for all sectors: engineering lot cost estimate 
(COST) and expected contract duration (MONTH). Xt is a vector of other observable 
technical attributes that are characteristic of each sector. These variables are also auction-
 
7 The majority of our sample auctions adopted the prequalification procedure. For instance, more than 90 
percent of road procurements used prequalification.  
8 There is only one significant coefficient, which is associated with the prequalification dummy variable in the 
case of electricity projects. This potentially affects the measured competition effect and may cause our unstable 
estimation result in this sector, as shown below. See Iimi (2008) for further details.    - 15 -
specific and expected to reflect the average project value for bidders. For road contracts, the 
total length of roads to be constructed and/or rehabilitated and the number of lanes of those 
roads are included. The type of work is also distinguished by new construction, rehabilitation 
and upgrading. For electricity contracts, the size of installed capacity in MW and the capacity 
of transmission lines—in terms of both voltage (kV) and length (km)—are measured. For the 
water- and sewage-sector contracts, similarly, the proxies of treatment capacity (million m
3 
per day) and total network length (km) are introduced to control for heterogeneity across 
projects.  
 
Since two sets of project data assisted by different organizations are merged, the donor 
dummy variable is supposed to capture the systematic difference in selected projects.
9 
Finally, the project location dummy variables are also included in Xt.  
                                                
 
Our (dis)aggregation is still imperfect in the sense that different types of components are 
pooled together, especially in the electricity and water sectors. However, one advantage of 
our data treatment is that we can remain sufficient observations, whence ensuring robustness 
of estimates.  
 
We are also allowed to infer the cost of an “average” infrastructure contract by pooling 
various but necessary components in each sector. Technically, we will evaluate the estimated 
bid function at the mean values of variables included. Any infrastructure project is a complex 
compound made up of various elements. This is an inherent and important feature of 
infrastructure projects. From the practitioner point of view, it is of little interest how much a 
specific type of equipment—for instance, a power generating turbine—costs. Such 
information may be publicly available on a list of manufacturing prices. Instead, an important 
 
9 In fact, the two data are different. In our sample, first, the Japanese aid data concentrates on 5–6 East and 
Southeast Asian countries. On the other hand, the World Bank data cover the rest of the world, such as Middle 
East and Africa. This is our “intended” selection bias to cover the whole developing world. Second, the 
Japanese data are only available for the contract amount greater than one billion Japanese yen (roughly 
9 million U.S. dollars). The World Bank data includes many small contracts, which may be less than 1 million 
U.S. dollars. Hence, the donor dummy variable may capture such systematic differences in projects and 
contracts assisted by the two donors.    - 16 -
policy question is how much it costs to procure a package of necessary equipment, civil 
works and facilities to supply 100 kWh to people. It must be composed of generators, 
transmission and distribution lines, dispatch systems and other facilities. Another example is 
this: Some procurement packages aim to purchase both generation turbines and transmission 
lines, and others not. In some cases, both water treatment plant construction and treated water 
distribution pipe installation were contracted out together, but in other cases they are 
procured separately. Then, how much does a “standard” contract package for the electricity 
or water system? By not disaggregating data, we can answer this question.  
 
Zi is a set of bidder-specific attributes. To control bidder heterogeneity, bidder nationalities 
are included in Zi. Firms from different countries naturally have different cost advantages. 
Local firms registered in a project host country may have better informational and physical 
access to local markets than foreign companies. Local firms may also have better knowledge 
of local administration and public administration. On the other hand, foreign firms may be 
more familiar with advanced technologies and have an accumulation of similar development 
projects.  
 
Our data cover 211 procurement auctions for infrastructure development projects in 29 
developing countries from 1997 to 2007. In total, 862 winning and losing bids are observed. 
The road, electricity and water sectors attracted 394, 193 and 329 bids, respectively. Table 2 
summarizes our data coverage in terms of country and sector.  
 
It is by no means comprehensive. First of all, our sample covers only 5 percent of total ODA 
in infrastructure. The total amount of contracts in our sample is about 6 billion U.S. dollars, 
which are distributed over the last decade or so. Total official assistance for infrastructure 
development amounts to US$ 12 billion a year.  
 
Second, the country coverage is narrow and partial. China’s projects are dominant. Road 
projects concentrate on three East Asian countries: China, the Philippines and Vietnam. The 
country coverage for water and sewage projects may be relatively broad, including Iran,   - 17 -
Mexico, and Thailand. But it is not random selection but subject to data availability. In the 
electricity sector, the total number of contracts collected is much smaller than the other two 
sectors, with a high concentration on China and Vietnam. With relatively limited 
participation per auction in this sector, the number of observed bids is even more limited. 
This may raise an empirical problem of robustness in the following analysis.  
 















China 21 103 24 106 15 43





India 5 11 1 3
Indonesia 3 3
Iran 7 41







Peru 3 16 4 16
Philippines 12 36
Sri Lanka 3 7 1 2 1 3
Swaziland 1 4
Tanzania 2 11 4 12 4 13
Thailand 8 56 9 57
Turkey 2 34
Uganda 2 3
Viet Nam 11 51 3 7 9 27
Yemen 4 16
Zambia 7 16
Total 86 394 78 329 47 139
Roads Water & sewage Electricity
 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
The summary statistics are shown in Table 3. The average bid amount for road projects is 29 
million U.S. dollars. While the average for water contracts is much smaller at 15 million U.S. 
dollar, the average bid amount in the electricity sector is largest at 49 million U.S. dollars. 
The engineering cost estimates are consistent with these figures. The contract duration is 
normally more than two years but with a wide range from 3 months to 6 years.  
 
On the technical side, the average length of road contract is 49 km. New road construction 
works amount to 35 percent of our road sample, and rehabilitation works amount to 30   - 18 -
percent. In the water and sewage sector, the average treatment capacity, if the work is to 
construct water and waste water plants, is 0.08 million m
3 per day. A pipe installation work 
involves about 33 km of iron pipes on average.
10 Half the contracts are related to the water 
supply sector. Note that a single contract sometimes covers both water supply and sewage 
works. While one-third are related to treatment plant construction, two-thirds aim at 
developing water distribution and collection networks. The electricity sector is most 
complicated, covering many different elements. The average installed capacity is 118 MW in 
our sample. If a contract includes transmission line installation, the “average” description 
may be 51 km of 43 kV lines.  
 
Table 3. Summary Statistics  
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Roads
Bid amount (million US$) 394 29.40 28.57 0.28 161.22
Number of bidders 394 8.02 5.27 2 21
Total road length (km) 394 48.97 65.85 2.24 448.00
Number of lanes 394 2.87 1.78 1 8
D (New roads) 3 9 40 . 3 50 . 4 8 0
D
1
(Rehabilitation work) 3 9 40 . 2 90 . 4 5 0
Cost estimate (million US$) 394 34.21 38.36 0.28 145.99
Contract duration (month) 394 31.61 11.75 5.00 50.00
Water and sewage
Bid amount (million US$) 329 15.00 23.13 0.33 276.66
Number of bidders 329 6.67 3.62 2 16
D
1
(Water) 3 2 90 . 4 40 . 5 0 0
D (Treatment plant) 3 2 90 . 3 50 . 4 8 0
D (Network) 3 2 90 . 6 40 . 4 8 0
Treatment capacity (million m3) 329 0.08 0.16 0.00 0.60
Total concrete tunnel length (km) 329 0.97 3.78 0.00 24.85
Total iron pipe length (km) 329 33.21 59.62 0.00 375.58
Cost estimate (million US$) 329 13.74 16.85 0.33 154.26
Contract duration (month) 329 28.23 16.66 3.00 72.00
Electricity
Bid amount (million US$) 139 49.06 71.96 0.22 435.49
Number of bidders 139 5.32 3.62 2 18
D (Dam) 1 3 90 . 0 90 . 2 9 0







(Trans. lines) 1 3 90 . 2 60 . 4 4 0
D (Substation) 1 3 90 . 2 60 . 4 4 0
D (Civil work) 1 3 90 . 6 50 . 4 8 0
Installed capacity (MW) 139 118.74 277.71 0.00 1200.00
Number of generators  139 1.37 2.78 0.00 12.00
Transmission line capacity (kV) 139 43.54 119.96 0.00 500.00
Total transmission line length (km) 139 50.58 149.22 0.00 765.00
Cost estimate (million US$) 139 44.27 66.69 0.25 406.61





Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
                                                 
10 These figures are underestimated, because both treatment plant and network contracts are pooled in our model. 
If a contract involves either component, the other capacity measurement is set at zero.    - 19 -
 
IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS  
 
Two models are examined in each sector. The first specification involves the engineering lot 
cost estimate as one of the independent variables; the second does not. An advantage of 
including the cost estimate variable is to improve accuracy in estimates, because it can 
control for unobservable technical heterogeneity across contracts. It is certain that many 
technical aspects are potentially omitted in our model. But all of them are expected to be 
reflected in a single monetary measurement, i.e., engineering cost estimate. Indeed, this 
variable has been found very powerful to explain the submitted bids, though not necessarily 
close to unity.
11 The coefficient is estimated at about 0.53 in road projects, meaning that the 
engineering cost is systematically overestimated by more than 40 percent (Table 4). The 
coefficient for water-related contracts is about 0.8, which can be similarly interpreted as a 
systematic overestimation (Table 5). In the electricity sector, on the other hand, the 
coefficient is estimated at 1.2 (Table 6). This may raise concern about underestimation and 
the consequence of cost overruns.  
 
The expected duration of project contracts has been found a weak explanatory variable, 
particularly when the engineering cost variable is included. This is partly because of high 
colinearity. In the road sector, for instance, the simple correlation coefficient is about 0.7.  
 
 
                                                 
11 The engineering cost estimates adopted in the paper are calculated by donors for project appraisal purposes. 
They may not necessarily reflect the best information at time of actual procurement. Moreover, they are not 
relevant to auctioneers’ reservation prices. For these reasons, our engineering estimates may be systematically 
biased due to donors’ calculation methods.    - 20 -


























































(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Length
2 1/ -0.41 -0.41 -0.39 -0.43 -0.65 -0.64 -0.61 -0.75





















(0.17) (0.19) (0.18) (0.21) (0.19) (0.22) (0.21) (0.25)





(3.17) (3.17) (3.18) (3.40) (4.02) (4.13) (4.05) (4.12)
D (Rehabilitation work) 1.67 2.02 1.16 1.14 -0.65 -1.15 -1.72 -4.59











*** -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.04






* -5.76 -5.35 -1.82
(2.58) (2.65) (2.53) (3.22) (3.69) (3.79) (3.67) (4.00)
Constant -1.67 -3.14 3.25 -9.71 -4.95 -2.66 5.27 -27.25
***
(4.50) (4.43) (4.40) (5.75) (6.13) (6.27) (6.10) (6.80)
Obs. 394 394 394 394 394 394 394 394
R-squared 0.932 0.932 0.932 0.933 0.903 0.903 0.905 0.909
Number of dummies
    Country 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
    Bidder nationality 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
1/ For presentation purposes, the coefficients are multiplied by 1,000. 
Note: The dependent variable is the bidding amount. The robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the 







Source: Author’s calculation.  
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N -0.08 -0.18 -0.49
*** -1.55
***


































D (Water) 0.95 0.93 0.94 1.01 1.76 1.52 1.68 1.71
(1.65) (1.66) (1.65) (1.66) (2.38) (2.35) (2.38) (2.56)





(6.88) (7.31) (7.10) (7.61) (14.31) (14.68) (14.42) (17.14)





(3.48) (3.52) (3.48) (3.81) (5.10) (5.12) (5.12) (5.09)





(0.55) (0.59) (0.57) (0.61) (1.25) (1.30) (1.27) (1.35)








(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19)
















* 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Donor 1 137.70





(14.87) (2.25) (2.25) (8.16) (8.62) (9.02) (8.95) (7.94)





(10.68) (14.32) (13.83) (11.11) (21.93) (21.47) (20.69) (25.30)
Obs. 329 329 329 329 329 329 329 329
R-squared 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.966 0.907 0.908 0.907 0.916
Number of dummies
    Country 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
    B i d d e r  n a t i o n a l i t y 2 02 02 02 02 02 02 02
Note: The dependent variable is the bidding amount. The robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
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** -28.14 -28.65 -29.12 -70.90
(8.26) (8.58) (8.42) (10.78) (20.85) (20.58) (20.32) (35.76)
D (Generator) 3.46 2.29 1.36 2.52 46.98 45.52 44.19 44.52
(7.91) (7.73) (7.49) (6.71) (31.18) (32.42) (32.18) (29.77)
D (Trans. lines) 18.79
** 20.20
* 21.43
** 12.14 47.30 49.02 50.91 22.61










(6.05) (5.99) (5.87) (6.75) (21.46) (21.62) (21.12) (19.62)









(4.23) (4.37) (4.44) (5.09) (28.54) (28.24) (28.19) (34.95)





(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16)
Installed capacity






(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13)




** -8.13 -8.67 -7.74 -20.18
*
(1.60) (1.56) (1.55) (2.06) (9.50) (9.24) (9.79) (12.09)




** 0.60 0.65 0.61 0.68
*











(0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.18) (0.78) (0.79) (0.78) (0.72)





(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.45) (0.43) (0.45) (0.52)
Trans. line length











(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Estimated duration -0.40 -0.20 -0.23 -0.04 -1.13 -0.88 -0.92 -0.19





*** 85.61 79.75 78.87 50.09
(12.87) (13.76) (12.83) (12.17) (58.99) (65.26) (61.85) (47.43)
Constant 16.30 26.93 27.71
* 2.14 44.77 57.83 58.68 13.74
(13.90) (19.17) (15.24) (16.53) (39.23) (52.50) (42.45) (51.41)
Obs. 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139
R-squared 0.981 0.981 0.982 0.983 0.779 0.779 0.780 0.811
Number of dummies
    C o u n t r y 1 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
    B i d d e r  n a t i o n a l i t y 1 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
1/ For presentation purposes, the coefficients are multiplied by 1,000. 
Note: The dependent variable is the bidding amount. The robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 









Source: Author’s calculation.  
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Regardless of sectors, the competition effect is broadly negative and statistically significant, 
as expected. The significance may differ depending on specifications. In road-related 
procurements, the equilibrium bid tends to decrease with the number of bidders involved, 
even in the most flexible model, which is partially nonparametric. As depicted in Figure 8, 
competition matters as N increases up to seven. Beyond that level, the competition effect 
tends to taper off.  
 
In the water and sewage sector, similarly, it seems that at least seven bidders are needed for 
an auction to be competitive enough (Figure 9). There is an unexpected negative coefficient 
associated with the case of N=2. But it is statistically insignificant; the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient is not different from that of D(N=3) cannot be rejected at the conventional 
significance level. The parametric models also support the pro-competitive effect of the 
number of bidders (Table 5).  
 
In the electricity-sector auctions, the estimated competition effect diminishes quickly, as N 
increases (Figure 10). If more than two firms participate in an auction, the incremental 
competition effect appears ambiguous. Three firms are enough according to our sample data. 
However, a fundamental question about the dynamic (endogenous) competition effect 
remains to be answered. Given the very skewed bidder participation distribution (Figure 7), it 
is technically infeasible to assess the potential competition effect beyond the supported range. 
It is far from conclusive whether the equilibrium bid would decline if a large number of 
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Source: Author’s calculation.  
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Source: Author’s calculation.  
 









































± 2 Std. Err.
 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
 
Many coefficients of contract-specific attributes may have counterintuitive signs when the 
engineering cost estimate is included in the equation. The reason is that the engineering cost 
variable has too strong explanatory power, leaving little variation for other independent   - 25 -
variables. The models without engineering cost estimates provide a much clear insight. 
Suppose that the engineering cost would be calculated based on other independent variables, 
i.e.,  t t t u X COST + = θ ' . Then, it is found that the equilibrium bid is an increasing function of 
road length and width, as expected. The estimated coefficient is about 0.25, meaning that an 
additional 1 km of road costs 0.25 million U.S. dollars (Table 4). It is clear that larger water 
treatment capacity will be more costly and long water distribution pipes are also costly 
(Table 5). The cost of procuring electricity generators increases with the size of installed 
capacity (Table 6).  
 
Based on these estimated bid functions evaluated at the mean values, the average equilibrium 
bid is calculated. This is the predicted cost of an artificial “average infrastructure contract.”
12 
It is worth recalling that there is no actual contract associated with this cost. The contract 
theoretically involves, for instance in the road case, 49 km of roads with 2.9 lanes, of which 
35 percent are new construction work and 30 percent are rehabilitation. For the mean 
evaluation points, see the summary statistics (Table 3). Roads would cost 0.5 million U.S. 
dollar per km on average (Table 7). A water and sewage procurement package will cost about 
770 U.S. dollars per m
3 of water treatment capacity. Note this package is, roughly speaking, a 
half-and-half mixture of water supply and sewage facilities and includes treatment plants as 
well as distribution and/or collection networks. If it is only for water supply infrastructure, it 
will cost 780 U.S. dollar per m
3, and a sewage contract will cost 760 U.S. dollars per m
3. 
Electricity generation installed capacity and associated facilities cost 0.44 million U.S. 
dollars per MW.  
 
Table 7. Predicted Unit Bid of “Average” Contract Package  





Road (per km) 0.50 (0.12)
Water & sewage (per million m3) 768.49 (137.01)
    Only water supply (per million m3) 780.05 (143.29)
    Only sewage (per million m3) 759.38 (133.28)
Electricity (per MW) 0.44 (0.03)
Note that the bid functions are evaluated at the mean values.   
Source: Author’s calculation.  
                                                 
12 It is assumed that our sample represents a typical composition of relevant sub-components in each sector.    - 26 -
 
These unit costs appear broadly consistent with the existing literature (e.g., Fay and Yepes, 
2003).
13 Importantly, however, in our model the estimated unit cost varies depending on the 
degree of competition and contract design. As shown in Figure 11, the road unit cost is 
projected to be 0.7 million U.S. dollars when auction competition is minimal ( ). The 
figure uses the log-linear model in Table 4. It can be reduced less than 0.5 million U.S. 
dollars per km if more than six firms compete with one another for the contract. In the water 
and electricity sectors, similarly, competition will bring additional cost savings in public 
procurement. The projected competition effect on public procurement costs looks moderate 
in the water sector (Figure 12). Note that the statistic reliability is particularly low in the 
electricity case (Figure 13).  
2 = N
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13 Fay and Yepes (2003) assumes that the unit cost of electricity infrastructure is $1.9 million per MW; for roads, 
$0.41 million per km; for water connection, $400 per household; and for sanitation connection, $700 per 
household.   - 27 -
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Source: Author’s calculation. 
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Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
In addition, the predicted unit cost is significantly affected by contract design, especially the 
size of contract. When the estimated equilibrium bid function for road projects is evaluated 
with different lengths of roads, it is evident that a road of less than 10 km would be 
extremely expensive (Figure 14). Hence, how to design lot packages is an important issue. 
As expected, large electricity projects have a lower unit cost, because of economies of scale. 
This fact calls for close collaboration among subnational governments—or communities, or 
neighboring countries, depending on the individual context—at the project preparation stage. 
Similarly, small projects with less than 100,000 m
3 of water treatment capacity or less than 
100 MW of electricity installed capacity will be expensive disproportionally (Figures 15 and 
16). However, large contracts will create another problem that only a small number of firms 
can apply for such auctions. There is a tradeoff between competition intensity at auctions and 
economies of scale in procurement.    - 28 -
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Source: Author’s calculation. 
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Source: Author’s calculation. 
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Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
The competition effect is of greater importance when the size of contract is particularly small. 
This is intuitively clear; as shown above, the unit cost tends to decrease with the size of   - 29 -
contract, meaning that the contract amount for a small project will be relatively high and may 
be profitable for contractors. At the same time, for a relatively small contract, a number of 
firms are expected to apply. Therefore, it is reasonable that the competition effect would play 
a powerful role in curtailing procurement costs of small projects. Figure 17 illustrates two 
competition effects evaluated at different contract sizes.  
 




















































) Case where lot length = 49 km 
(sample mean).
Case where lot length = 10 km.
Avg. number 




Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
The estimated bid functions allow to calculate the average unit cost of each project element 
contained in a standard contract. Except the road case, the above “average package” concept 
may not be clear enough. By setting irrelevant attributes at zeros, for instance, the cost of 
installing a 100 MW generator can be estimated at about one million U.S. dollars per MW 
(Table 8). Obviously, the unit cost is much lower due to economies of scale if a larger turbine 
is purchased. An installation work of 10 km transmission lines will cost 89 million U.S. 
dollars. Again, if only 1 km of transmission line is put in place, it will be prohibitively 
expensive. The unit cost would likely decline dramatically when the bulk of transmission 
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Table 8. Predicted Unit Bid of Individual Item: Electricity    






10 MW 7.78 (2.55)
100 MW 1.07 (0.35)
500 MW 0.38 (0.14)
1,000 MW 0.18 (0.06)
Transmission line installation
1 km 96.14 (45.38)
10 km 8.92 (4.24)
25 km 3.11 (1.52)
50 km 1.20 (0.65)
100 km 0.27 (0.30) 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
From the water-sector bid function, similarly, it is found that a water treatment plant with a 
daily production capacity of 0.5 million m
3—which may be usable in a medium-sized city 
with 1–2 million of population—would cost about 58 U.S. dollars per m
3 per day (Table 9). 
If a water treatment plant produces only 0.1 million m
3 of water per day—as in a smaller 
town—it will cost more than 200 U.S. dollars per m
3.
14 The unit cost is 3 times as high as the 
procurement package of 0.5 million m
3 of treatment capacity.  
 






0.01 million m3 per day 777.85 (323.11)
0.05 million m3 per day 329.94 (49.45)
0.1 million m3 per day 202.52 (26.14)
0.5 million m3 per day 57.94 (7.62)
1 million m3 per day 32.73 (4.52)
Waste water treatment plant
0.01 million m3 per day 609.72 (309.97)
0.05 million m3 per day 296.32 (28.78)
0.1 million m3 per day 185.71 (11.87)
0.5 million m3 per day 54.58 (4.84)
1 million m3 per day 31.04 (3.22)
Iron pipe installation
1 km 9.22 (1.27)
5 km 2.14 (0.22)
10 km 1.13 (0.11)
50 km 0.26 (0.02)
100 km 0.13 (0.01)
500 km 0.03 (0.00) 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
 
                                                 
14 These estimated costs are broadly consistent with the actual development costs of water treatment plant 
construction projects, which may range from 60 to 300 U.S. dollars per m
3 per day.    - 31 -
V. DISCUSSION   
 
Financial needs for infrastructure development: revisited  
As mentioned above, an important problem in the previous literature forecasting the 
infrastructure financial needs is that the unit cost is assumed constant, whatever its basis is. It 
means that the roles of procurement efficiency and contract design are ignored.
15 However, 
these cannot be underestimated as shown in the previous section. In reality, for instance, how 
to design road procurements is crucial to contain government purchasing costs (Grimm, et al., 
2006). The ROCKS database covering more than 3,000 road contracts over the developing 
world reveals that the majority of road contracts are less than 60 km, which would result in 
higher unit costs than our efficient procurement price, holding other conditions constant; 
these contracts were in fact awarded with extremely high unit prices (Figure 18).  
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Source: Author’s calculation based on ROCKS database.  
 
Using our estimation results, the financial needs are reassessed with particular focus on 
procurement efficiency and less attention paid to the quantity side. We concentrate on 
examining the unit price impact. The quantity of infrastructure demand—thus supply—is 
projected by the simple cross-country bivariate relationship between economic development 
                                                 
15 Fay and Yepes (2003) assumes that the unit cost of electricity infrastructure is $1.9 million per MW; for roads, 
$0.41 million per km; for water connection, $400 per household; and for sanitation connection, $700 per 
household.    - 32 -
and infrastructure accumulation (Figure 19).
16 A constant elasticity of paved road stocks with 
respect to GDP is estimated at 0.828. Using the average real growth rate in the past five-year, 
the annual growth rate in paved roads in each country is calculated. The elasticity of 
electricity capacity is almost unity. The elasticity of improved water and sanitation access 
with respect to per capita GDP varies depending on development level. Notably, additional 
populations with water supply and sewage access are calculated separately, though our bid 
function cover both simultaneously. But they are basically independent systems. This 
calculation does ignore the causality problem for simplicity. But in our argument it does not 
matter which causes which. The important fact is that more infrastructure capacity is required 
to support economic growth and such positive correlation is very predictable even in a simple 
regression.  
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Ln(Paved Road) = 0.828 Ln(GDP) - 10.091
                           (0.037)               (0.856)
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Ln(Installed Capacity) = 1.014 Ln(GDP) - 23.147
                                  (0.033)               (0.774)
R




























































Sanitation Facility Access = 38.92 Ln(GDP per capita) - 1.60 Ln(GDP per capita)
2 - 130.2
                       (8.71)                                (0.57)                               (32.29)
R
2 = 0.63  Obs. = 148
 
Water Access = 31.14 Ln(GDP per capita) - 1.47 Ln(GDP per capita)
2 - 65.27
                       (6.04)                               (0.37)                                 (24.06)
R
2 = 0.56  Obs. = 159

























Source: Author’s calculation from World Development Indicators and Energy Information Administration.  
                                                 
16 This follows, for instance, World Bank (1994). For more sophisticated empirics, see Canning and Pedroni 
(1999), Fay and Yepes (2003), and Calderón and Servén (2004). While Calderón and Servén estimate the 
impact of infrastructure quantity and quality on economic growth, Fay and Yepes estimate the effect of 
economic growth and other conditions on infrastructure accumulation.    - 33 -
 
The total impact of improving auction efficiency is found enormous on the aggregate level. 
Table 10 reveals that competition could save a lot of public resources and aid money. It 
amounts to roughly 32 billion U.S. dollars a year, which is equivalent to 8.2 percent of total 
infrastructure (electricity, roads, water and sewage) development costs. While the baseline 
refers to the average level of competition in the sample, the efficiency scenario assumes that 
competition is increased to the optimal level.
17 On the quantity side, the incremental 
infrastructure requirements are calculated by applying the average economic (GDP or per 
capita GDP) growth rate for the past 5 years to the above relationship in Figure 19. For all 
sectors combined, the annual financial needs are estimated at about 392 billion U.S. dollars 
under the baseline assumption and about 360 billion U.S. dollars in the efficiency scenario.  
 
Table 10. Predicted Financial Needs for Infrastructure Development  
(Million US$)  
Memorandum: Fay and Roads Electricity Water & Sewage




















East Asia & Pacific 20,608 43,378 9,871 75,012 70,482 22,227 19,954 72,646 63,647 10,483 10,373 16,332 16,153
Europe & Central Asia 26,254 32,976 5,037 46,313 43,516 13,878 12,458 45,356 39,738 1,981 1,960 3,086 3,052
Latin America & Caribbean 6,919 25,627 5,026 4,940 4,642 4,139 3,716 13,528 11,852 469 464 731 723
Middle East & North Africa 6,924 11,932 2,749 8,082 7,594 2,124 1,906 6,941 6,081 546 541 851 842
South Asia 22,328 18,110 7,792 57,677 54,194 5,456 4,898 17,832 15,624 6,581 6,512 10,254 10,141
Sub-Saharan Africa 7,523 6,214 4,513 5,248 4,931 1,396 1,254 4,564 3,998 2,092 2,070 3,260 3,224
Total (sector) 90,556 138,237 34,988 197,272 185,359 49,220 44,186 160,866 140,941 22,153 21,920 34,514 34,133
Efficiency gains 11,913 5,034 19,926 234 380
    % of total cost 6.0 10.2 12.4 1.1 1.1
Grand total 263,781 392,652 360,433
Efficiency gains 32,219
    % of total cost 8.2 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
Our finding is supportive of the positive nexus between growth and good governance. In the 
existing literature, especially growth empirics, the growth-governance linkage has been 
ambiguous (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; 2004; Easterly, et al., 2004). The main reason is that 
one could not agree on the definition of “good governance” (e.g., Easterly 2003). It may 
include a wide range of factors from political stability to government effectiveness. But as far 
as public procurement is concerned, good governance can be measured as efficiency in 
                                                 
17 From the above discussion, seven firms are required for road and water procurements. While the baseline case 
assumes N=4, the optimal level in the electricity projects is assumed five. This is because the sample mean of 
the number of bidders is already 5.3.    - 34 -
auctions, and the magnitude of likely efficiency gains has been estimated at some 8 percent 
of total costs. This is considerable compared with the corruption cost, which is, for instance, 
about 3½ percent of public contract amounts in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is also unignorable 
from the fiscal point of view; the savings of 32 billion U.S. dollars are approximately 0.4 
percent of GDP of the developing world.  
 
Compared with Fay and Yepes (2003), there are several discrepancies. But this is mainly 
because of the difference in quantity forecasts. The predicted increases in infrastructures for 
China, India and several Eastern European countries may be overestimated in our estimates, 
reflecting their recent strong economic buoyancy. It is true that accelerated growth would 
require more rapid accumulation in infrastructure, but the supply capacity is a typical 
problem that developing countries are faced with. Because these countries are much large, 
the financial need estimates can be easily inflated. In other regions (Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa), the estimated 
requirements are quite comparable with the existing estimates.  
 
Another important remark is that “the scale of projects needs to be tailored to economics and 
technology (World Bank, 2006).” In many cases, the unbundling and medullar approach are 
appropriate to deliver infrastructure services. However, it turns out a mistake to pursue for 
the segmented structure if the markets are small, as evident in the World Bank’s early 
experience in the electricity sector. As shown, the unit cost of electricity projects differs 
considerably depending on project and procurement design. According to our estimation 
results (Figure 15), 1.9 million U.S. dollars per MW assumed in the previous study seems a 
relatively high unit cost, which is expected to be realized when a small installed unit is 
procured. When evaluating the estimated bid function at a capacity of 30 MW, the financial 
requirements turn out consistent with the existing forecasts. Obviously, there are technical 
constraints to install large-size generators. On one hand, smaller generators may be needed 
for remote areas, and on the other hand, regional collaboration is one possibility to increase 
scale economies (i.e., achieving the minimum efficient size). In particular in Africa, many 
opportunities remain for collective development and operation of infrastructure. For instance,   - 35 -
Africa has more than 60 shared rivers, which can be interpreted as opportunities for regional 
cooperation in water development and management (World Bank, 2005).  
 
Donors also have to coordinate with each other. In the health sector, which has become a 
major recipient of aid, an emerging concern is that an ever-increasing proportion of 
assistance for health from a large number of donors through vertical funds could lead to 
increased transaction costs for governments (OECD, 2008). If donors concentrate on small-
scale infrastructure assistance without coordination, the same problem would occur.   
 
Notably, there are many simplifications in the above calculation. First, our prediction of 
infrastructure demand and supply in terms of quantity is very static but not dynamic in a 
statistical sense. It may or may not be correct. But the measured efficiency gains on the unit 
cost side are reliable. Second, our unit costs are associated with a basket composed of various 
sub-components necessary for an “average” development project in our sample (Table 7). It 
covers not only main components, such as generators and treatment plants, but also their 
associated facilities. We implicitly assume that the composition of these sub-elements in our 
sample represents the whole picture of infrastructure projects. But this may not be true. 
Related to this, third, our efficient unit costs still have reservations, because project 
specifications are different in reality. Not all roads are supposed to be paved and have two 
lanes—more precisely 2.9 lanes in our case. Not all people are required to be supplied treated 
and piped water. Some may rely on clean well-water. Finally, in the case of the water and 
sewage sector, the projected demand for improved water access is converted to the volume of 
water produced by assuming that per capita per day water consumption is 413 liters.
18 This is 




                                                 
18 Although there is considerable difference in per capita water consumption among countries, the average water 
consumption (both residential and industrial) per capita per year is estimated at 151 m
3, which is 413 liter on a 
per day basis (World Water Organization).    - 36 -
Africa-specific effects?  
Another interesting policy question is whether the conventional Africa-specific negative 
effect is observed. A number of cross-country studies, throwing a dummy variable for Africa 
in the model, have demonstrated that African countries share some unobserved 
characteristics, which usually have adverse effects on economic development.  
 
Sachs and Warner (1997) attributes Africa’s slow growth to poor governance, landlockness 
and the dynamic Dutch disease syndrome associated with abundant natural resources. It is 
true that many African countries do not have physical and effective access to the sea. Iimi 
(2007) also indicates the extent that natural resources are properly linked to growth is 
dependent on governance; many African countries are lagging behind in this area. Glaeser et 
al. (2004) shows that human capital is more important for growth than the institutions. On 
the other hand, it may be just because of geographic conditions, such as temperature and 
precipitation, along with structural poverty traps (Bloom, et al., 2003).  
 
In our results, there is no clear indication that African countries bear high procurement costs 
because of “unobserved African factors.” The estimated country-specific fixed effects are 
different from sector to sector. In our limited sample countries, Africa’s road procurement 
costs are not systematically increased by unobservables. The normalized country dummy 
coefficients for Ethiopia and Ghana are relatively low compared with other regions 
(Figure 20).
19 But the Swaziland-specific effect may be among the highest.  
 
In the water and sewage sector, Tanzania’s project costs may be systematically high. 
However, this cannot be over-generalized because of our narrow country coverage. In the 
electricity sector, it is found that most African countries in our sample, such as Nigeria, 
Tanzania and Uganda, bear additional infrastructure project costs associated with some 
unspecified elements in our models. This is consistent with the conventional “Africa-
specific” adverse effect view. Further analysis is required to examine what it is.  
                                                 
19 This does not mean that Africa’s project costs are relatively low. Rather, it means that there is no evidence 
that African countries would have a common unobserved factor affecting the public procurement results.    - 37 -
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Note: The baseline (smallest coefficient) is Tanzania for roads, Morocco for water and sewage, and 
Sri Lanka for electricity. Countries without bars do not have relevant projects in our sample. 
 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
In sum, some of the direct policy implications from all the discussion are as follows:  
 
  Competition is important to increase auction efficiency in procurement auctions for 
road and water infrastructure projects and to a lesser extent in the electricity sector.  
  Auctioneers are encouraged to increase bidder participation, preferably to involve 
seven or more firms per auction.  
  Even on our efficient procurement cost basis, the financial needs of developing 
countries for infrastructure development are sizable at about 360 billion U.S. dollars 
per annum. Greater efforts are required toward improving efficiency in public 
investments.  
  The total benefits from improved auction efficiency will reach 8.2 percent of total 
investment costs.  
  Auction design does also matter for infrastructure cost minimization. Small 
procurement contracts are prohibitively expensive. In preparing infrastructure 
projects, coordination among subnational governments, communities, or neighboring 
countries is useful to containing procurement costs.  
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VI. CONCLUSION   
 
Infrastructure is recognized as the engine for economic growth. Public resources are not 
sufficient for infrastructure development in developing countries. It is still arguable whether 
the public resources are used efficiently, particularly where the public procurement systems 
are fragile.  
 
The paper, using auction data on official development assistance for infrastructure projects, 
focuses on efficiency in public procurement. In theory, competition is a key to increasing 
auction efficiency and thus achieving the lowest possible procurement costs. Intensified 
competition is also instrumental in preventing collusion and corruption and promoting local 
business development.  
 
A main question is how much competition could contribute to reducing infrastructure 
investment costs. This is an attempt to quantify the impact of a particular form of public 
governance improvement on the economy. The paper examines how many bidders are 
required toward procurement efficiency. Three infrastructure sectors are analyzed: roads, 
water and sewage, and electricity. 
 
The current level of in the infrastructure procurement process is not so high, except for road 
procurements. The estimated equilibrium bid functions generally support the view that by 
encouraging more competition a lot of public resources and aid money could be saved. It is 
shown that in road and water projects, at least seven firms are required for an auction to be 
competitive enough. The required level of competition for electricity projects may be much 
lower, perhaps at three, but this is less conclusive.  
 
Unlike the existing literature, the current paper highlights the importance of procurement 
efficiency to contain infrastructure procurement prices, which have rarely been questioned in 
the past. By increasing competition to the optimal levels, the predicted financial needs could   - 39 -
be reduced considerably. Under several simple assumptions, total benefits are estimated at 
8.2 percent of annual infrastructure investment costs.  
 
It is also found that how to design lot contracts, especially the size of contracts, is another 
important factor to achieve the lowest possible procurement costs. It will be costly to divide a 
project into a number of small-scale lot contracts, though more competition can be expected. 
Procuring an infrastructure project under a single contract would generally help bring cost 
savings. But it may limit firms who can apply for such a large contract. It is important to 
balance the tradeoff between competition in auctions and economies of scale in procurement.  
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